SYSTEM DESIGN · V2.0 CONFIDENTIAL

nullchemy

Microservice System Design Document

7 SERVICES 1 SHARED CORE 99.9% SLA TARGET KUBERNETES DEPLOYMENT
Part I

Foundation

The architectural bedrock of nullchemy — defining the system's quantitative targets, global structure, and the shared core that binds every microservice together.

Section 1.1

Executive Summary

nullchemy is a microservice platform composed of seven independent servicesauth-service, user-service, notifications-service, documents-service, inventory-service, analytics-service, and audit-service — all built upon a shared pip-installable core package named tq-core. The system is designed for horizontal scalability on Kubernetes, with asynchronous inter-service communication, strict data ownership boundaries, and a unified authentication layer at the API gateway.

The architecture follows a shared-nothing principle: each service owns its database, no two services share a schema, and all cross-service data flow happens through well-defined APIs or asynchronous message channels. The core package tq-core eliminates duplication by providing JWT authentication, database session factories, base ORM models, Pydantic schemas, middleware, and structured logging — every service installs it as a versioned dependency.

10,000 Peak RPS Target
<100ms p95 Latency Budget
99.9% Availability SLA
Design Principle Every architectural decision in this document is anchored in quantitative reasoning. Where we choose async messaging over synchronous HTTP, we cite the p95 latency differential. Where we allocate resource limits, we base them on load-test data. No decision is made on intuition alone.

Key quantitative targets and design principles:

  • Peak throughput: 10,000 requests per second across the API gateway, with each service individually capable of 1,000–3,000 RPS depending on its I/O profile.
  • Latency budget: p95 < 100ms for all read endpoints; p95 < 500ms for write endpoints that involve cross-service async communication.
  • Availability: 99.9% uptime SLA (approximately 8.76 hours of downtime per year), enforced via Kubernetes auto-scaling, pod anti-affinity, and multi-zone deployment.
  • Data consistency: Strong consistency within each service boundary; eventual consistency across services via the message broker (RabbitMQ), with a maximum staleness window of 5 seconds.
  • Security posture: JWT-based authentication at the gateway, TLS everywhere, network policies isolating service-to-service traffic, and a dedicated audit trail across all mutating operations.
Section 1.2

Architecture Overview

The global architecture follows a gateway-perimeter pattern: all external traffic enters through Kong API Gateway, which handles JWT validation, rate limiting, and request routing before forwarding to the appropriate microservice. Services communicate with each other through a RabbitMQ message broker for asynchronous operations, and directly via HTTP for synchronous reads that require immediate consistency.

graph TD
    Client["Client (Web/Mobile/CLI)"]
    APIG["API Gateway (Kong)"]
    AuthSvc["auth-service"]
    UserSvc["user-service"]
    NotifSvc["notifications-service"]
    DocSvc["documents-service"]
    InvSvc["inventory-service"]
    AnalytSvc["analytics-service"]
    AuditSvc["audit-service"]
    CorePkg["tq-core (Shared Package)"]
    DB[(PostgreSQL Cluster)]
    Cache[(Redis Cache)]
    MQ{{"Message Broker (RabbitMQ)"}}

    Client -->|HTTPS| APIG
    APIG -->|JWT Auth| AuthSvc
    APIG -->|Route| UserSvc
    APIG -->|Route| NotifSvc
    APIG -->|Route| DocSvc
    APIG -->|Route| InvSvc
    APIG -->|Route| AnalytSvc
    APIG -->|Route| AuditSvc
    AuthSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    UserSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    NotifSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    DocSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    InvSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    AnalytSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    AuditSvc -->|import| CorePkg
    AuthSvc --> DB
    UserSvc --> DB
    NotifSvc --> DB
    DocSvc --> DB
    InvSvc --> DB
    AnalytSvc --> DB
    AuditSvc --> DB
    AuthSvc --> Cache
    UserSvc --> Cache
    NotifSvc --> Cache
    MQ --> AuthSvc
    MQ --> UserSvc
    MQ --> NotifSvc
    MQ --> DocSvc
    MQ --> InvSvc
    MQ --> AnalytSvc
    MQ --> AuditSvc
    AuthSvc --> MQ
    UserSvc --> MQ
    NotifSvc --> MQ
    DocSvc --> MQ
    InvSvc --> MQ
    AnalytSvc --> MQ
    AuditSvc --> MQ
                        
Figure 1: High-level architecture — all external requests flow through Kong API Gateway, which authenticates against the shared auth library from tq-core. Microservices communicate asynchronously via RabbitMQ for non-blocking operations and directly via HTTP for synchronous reads. Each service owns its database schema within a shared PostgreSQL cluster.
Architectural Decision We deliberately chose a shared PostgreSQL cluster (with per-service schemas) over fully independent database instances. This decision reduces operational overhead at the cost of introducing a partial blast radius — a cluster-wide outage affects all services. For the initial deployment scale (<50K RPS), this trade-off is acceptable. A migration path to independent RDS instances per service is documented in Open Questions.
Section 1.3

Core Package: tq-core

tq-core is the shared Python package installed by every nullchemy microservice. It is versioned, published to a private PyPI registry, and pinned in each service's pyproject.toml. The package eliminates code duplication across seven services, ensures consistent behavior for cross-cutting concerns, and provides a single source of truth for authentication, database access, and schema definitions.

Package Structure

The following table lists every module exposed by tq-core. Each module is imported by at least five of the seven services.

ModuleResponsibilityUsed By
tq_core.configPydantic Settings loader — reads from .env, environment variables, and Kubernetes ConfigMaps. Provides a consistent Settings base class for all services.All 7 services
tq_core.authJWT creation and verification (HS256/RS256), bcrypt password hashing, get_current_user FastAPI dependency, token refresh logic.All 7 services
tq_core.dbAsync SQLAlchemy engine factory using asyncpg, session dependency (get_db), connection pooling configuration, and health check utilities.All 7 services
tq_core.middlewareRate limiting (in-memory sliding window, Redis-backed for production), security headers (X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, etc.), request ID propagation, and CORS configuration.All 7 services
tq_core.exceptionsCommon exception hierarchy — NotFoundError, AuthenticationError, AuthorizationError, ValidationError, ConflictError, BusinessLogicError, RateLimitError. Includes a setup_exception_handlers(app) utility.All 7 services
tq_core.models.baseBase ORM model with UUID primary key, soft-delete (is_deleted, deleted_at, deleted_by_id), optimistic locking (version), and audit fields (created_by_id, updated_by_id). Inherits from SQLAlchemy 2.x DeclarativeBase with AsyncAttrs.6 services (all except analytics-service, which uses a time-series schema)
tq_core.schemas.basePydantic v2 base schemas — BaseSchema (with audit fields), PaginatedResponse[T] (with links and meta), and PaginatedResponse.create() factory method.All 7 services
tq_core.loggingStructured logging setup — JSON format in production, console in development. Configurable log level via LOG_LEVEL env var. Exports a pre-configured logger instance.All 7 services
tq_core.cacheRedis client wrapper — async get/set/delete with TTL, cache key generation utilities, and a decorator for caching function results.5 services (auth, user, inventory, notifications, analytics)
tq_core.messagingRabbitMQ publisher/consumer abstractions — connection pooling, automatic retry with exponential backoff, dead-letter queue configuration, and typed message schemas.6 services (all except analytics-service, which uses Kafka for event ingestion)
Versioning Strategy tq-core follows semantic versioning (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH). Breaking changes (e.g., removing a field from BaseSchema) trigger a MAJOR bump. All services pin to a specific MINOR version (e.g., tq-core==2.3.*) and upgrade during scheduled maintenance windows. A CI pipeline runs integration tests across all services whenever a new tq-core version is published.
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Part II

Microservices

Each service is an independent deployable unit with its own database schema, API contract, and scaling policy. Together they form the nullchemy platform — each designed to do one thing well, with clear ownership boundaries and well-defined integration points.

Section 2.1

auth-service

Role: The identity provider for the entire platform. Handles user registration, login, token issuance and refresh, password management, and multi-factor authentication (MFA). It is the only service that stores password hashes and issues JWTs.

Database strategy: Owns the auth schema within the shared PostgreSQL cluster. Tables: users (core identity), sessions (active refresh tokens), mfa_devices, password_reset_tokens. No other service reads from this schema directly — all identity lookups go through the auth-service API or the validated JWT claims.

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
POST/api/v1/auth/registerRegister a new user account. Returns access + refresh tokens.None
POST/api/v1/auth/loginAuthenticate with email + password. Returns token pair.None
POST/api/v1/auth/refreshExchange a valid refresh token for a new access token.Refresh Token
GET/api/v1/auth/meReturn the authenticated user's identity and profile.Bearer JWT
POST/api/v1/auth/logoutInvalidate the current refresh token (server-side revocation).Bearer JWT
POST/api/v1/auth/forgot-passwordSend a password reset email with a time-limited token.None
PATCH/api/v1/auth/reset-passwordReset password using a valid reset token.Reset Token
POST/api/v1/auth/mfa/enrollEnroll a TOTP device for multi-factor authentication.Bearer JWT

Entity Schema: users (auth schema)

User (auth.users) PostgreSQL Table
idUUID (PK)Primary key, generated by the application
emailVARCHAR(255) UNIQUELogin identifier, case-insensitive
password_hashVARCHAR(128)bcrypt hash, never exposed via API
is_activeBOOLEANSoft disable without deletion
is_verifiedBOOLEANEmail verification status
mfa_enabledBOOLEANWhether MFA is required for login
roleVARCHAR(50)RBAC role: superadmin, admin, user, readonly
created_atTIMESTAMPTZServer-generated on insert
updated_atTIMESTAMPTZAuto-updated on modification

Dependencies: tq-core (auth, db, exceptions, logging), notifications-service (async — for sending welcome emails, password reset emails via RabbitMQ), audit-service (async — all login/logout events are published to the audit queue).

Scaling Note The auth-service is stateless except for the refresh token table. Under expected load (5,000 logins/hour peak), a single pod with 2 CPU and 512Mi memory handles the load comfortably. The critical path — JWT verification — is cached at the API gateway, so downstream services do not call auth-service on every request.
Section 2.2

user-service

Role: Manages user profiles, preferences, and account-level settings. This service owns the extended user data — everything about a user that is not authentication-related: display names, avatars, contact details, notification preferences, and account metadata.

Database strategy: Owns the users schema. Tables: profiles (1:1 with auth.users via auth_user_id FK reference — logical, not enforced by DB constraint since tables reside in different schemas), preferences, avatars. The user-service never stores passwords or handles authentication directly.

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
GET/api/v1/users/meReturn the current user's full profile.Bearer JWT
PATCH/api/v1/users/meUpdate the current user's profile fields.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/users/{id}Retrieve another user's public profile.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/usersList users with pagination, filtering, and search (admin only).Bearer JWT + Admin
POST/api/v1/users/avatarUpload a new avatar image (delegates to documents-service for storage).Bearer JWT

Dependencies: tq-core (auth, db, schemas, exceptions, logging, cache), auth-service (sync HTTP — validates user existence on profile creation), documents-service (sync HTTP — avatar uploads), audit-service (async — profile changes are audited).

Section 2.3

notifications-service

Role: Centralized notification delivery engine. Handles email (SMTP + SendGrid), SMS (Twilio), and push notifications (Firebase Cloud Messaging). Other services publish notification requests to a RabbitMQ queue; this service consumes them, renders templates, and dispatches to the appropriate channel.

Database strategy: Owns the notifications schema. Tables: templates (Jinja2 templates stored in DB for runtime editing), messages (outbox of all sent notifications with status tracking), delivery_logs (per-channel delivery status with timestamps), preferences (per-user channel opt-in/opt-out).

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
POST/api/v1/notifications/sendQueue a notification for delivery (used by other services).Service Token
GET/api/v1/notifications/historyRetrieve notification history for the authenticated user.Bearer JWT
PATCH/api/v1/notifications/preferencesUpdate channel preferences for the authenticated user.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/notifications/templatesList all notification templates (admin only).Bearer JWT + Admin

Dependencies: tq-core (auth, db, messaging, logging), RabbitMQ (consumes notification requests from all other services), external providers (SendGrid, Twilio, Firebase).

Section 2.4

documents-service

Role: Document storage, retrieval, versioning, and metadata management. Supports upload of any file type with content-type validation, generates thumbnails for images, and provides signed URLs for secure downloads. Integrates with object storage (S3-compatible) for binary data.

Database strategy: Owns the documents schema. Tables: documents (metadata — filename, MIME type, size, S3 key, version chain), document_versions (version history with content hashes), tags, document_tags (many-to-many). Binary data is stored in S3/MinIO, not in PostgreSQL.

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
POST/api/v1/documents/uploadUpload a new document. Returns metadata + signed download URL.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/documents/{id}Retrieve document metadata.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/documents/{id}/downloadGenerate a signed download URL and redirect.Bearer JWT
POST/api/v1/documents/{id}/versionsUpload a new version of an existing document.Bearer JWT
DELETE/api/v1/documents/{id}Soft-delete a document (marks as deleted, retains in S3 for 30 days).Bearer JWT

Dependencies: tq-core (auth, db, exceptions, logging), S3-compatible object storage (MinIO in development, AWS S3 in production), audit-service (async — document access and version changes).

Section 2.5

inventory-service

Role: Manages stock items, categories, warehouses, and inventory movements. Tracks quantities across multiple locations, handles stock reservations, and emits low-stock alerts. Designed for eventual consistency with the analytics-service for real-time inventory dashboards.

Database strategy: Owns the inventory schema. Tables: items (SKU, name, description, unit), categories (hierarchical), warehouses (locations), stock_levels (item + warehouse + quantity with optimistic locking), movements (audit trail of all stock changes — inbound, outbound, transfer, adjustment).

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
GET/api/v1/inventory/itemsList items with pagination, category filter, and search.Bearer JWT
POST/api/v1/inventory/itemsCreate a new inventory item.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/inventory/items/{id}/stockGet current stock levels across all warehouses for an item.Bearer JWT
POST/api/v1/inventory/movementsRecord a stock movement (inbound, outbound, transfer).Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/inventory/low-stockList all items below their reorder threshold.Bearer JWT

Dependencies: tq-core (auth, db, schemas, cache, messaging, logging), notifications-service (async — low-stock alerts via RabbitMQ), analytics-service (async — stock movement events for dashboard aggregation), audit-service (async — all movements).

Section 2.6

analytics-service

Role: Event ingestion, metrics aggregation, and reporting. Consumes events from a dedicated Kafka topic (high-throughput event stream) and RabbitMQ (lower-throughput operational events). Provides aggregated dashboards, time-series queries, and CSV/PDF report generation.

Database strategy: Uses a time-series optimized schema separate from the standard tq-core base model. Tables in the analytics schema: events_raw (append-only event log, partitioned by month), metrics_hourly (pre-aggregated hourly rollups), metrics_daily (daily rollups), reports (scheduled report definitions). Also queries a read replica of the inventory schema for real-time stock analytics.

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
GET/api/v1/analytics/dashboardReturn aggregated KPIs for the main dashboard.Bearer JWT
GET/api/v1/analytics/metricsQuery time-series data with time range and granularity params.Bearer JWT
POST/api/v1/analytics/eventsIngest a new event (also available via Kafka for high throughput).Service Token
GET/api/v1/analytics/reportsList available reports and their generation status.Bearer JWT

Dependencies: tq-core (config, auth, logging, schemas), Kafka (primary event ingestion), RabbitMQ (operational events from other services), PostgreSQL with partitioning support.

Section 2.7

audit-service

Role: Immutable audit trail for all mutating operations across the platform. Consumes audit events from a dedicated RabbitMQ queue, writes them to an append-only table, and provides query APIs for compliance and investigation. Designed for write-once, read-infrequently access patterns.

Database strategy: Owns the audit schema. Primary table: audit_log — append-only, partitioned by month, with BRIN indexes on timestamp. Columns: event_id, timestamp, service_name, user_id, action, resource_type, resource_id, old_values (JSONB), new_values (JSONB), ip_address, user_agent, correlation_id. No UPDATE or DELETE operations are ever performed on this table.

Key API Endpoints

MethodPathDescriptionAuth
GET/api/v1/audit/logsQuery audit logs with filters (user, service, date range, action).Bearer JWT + Admin
GET/api/v1/audit/logs/{event_id}Retrieve a single audit event in full detail.Bearer JWT + Admin
GET/api/v1/audit/exportExport audit logs as CSV for a given time range (async — returns a download link).Bearer JWT + Admin

Dependencies: tq-core (auth, db, messaging, logging), RabbitMQ (consumes audit events from all services). This service has zero outbound dependencies — it never calls another service.

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Part III

Communication & Data

How the seven services talk to each other, how data flows through the system, and where consistency boundaries are drawn.

Section 3.1

Authentication & Authorization Flow

The authentication flow begins at the API gateway and propagates through every service via signed JWTs. The gateway validates the token on every request (using the shared secret from tq-core), extracts the user identity and role, and forwards them as headers to downstream services. This eliminates the need for each service to call auth-service on every request.

sequenceDiagram
    participant C as Client
    participant G as API Gateway (Kong)
    participant A as auth-service
    participant Core as tq-core (Shared)
    participant T as Target Service
    participant Audit as audit-service

    C->>G: POST /login (email + password)
    G->>A: Forward login request
    A->>Core: verify_password(plain, hash)
    Core-->>A: password valid
    A->>Core: create_access_token(user_data)
    Core-->>A: signed JWT
    A->>Core: create_refresh_token(user_data)
    Core-->>A: signed refresh token
    A->>Audit: Publish login event (async via RabbitMQ)
    A-->>G: access + refresh tokens
    G-->>C: tokens (HTTPOnly cookies)

    Note over C,T: All subsequent API calls

    C->>G: GET /users/me (Bearer token)
    G->>G: Validate JWT signature via tq-core
    G->>T: Proxy request + X-User-ID + X-User-Role headers
    T->>Core: get_current_user(headers)
    Core-->>T: UserData object
    T->>T: Authorize based on role
    T-->>G: Response
    G-->>C: JSON payload
                        
Figure 2: Login and authenticated request flow. The shared tq-core package provides password hashing, token creation, and token verification used by both the auth-service and every downstream service. The API gateway caches JWT validation for 5 minutes, reducing auth-service load.
Gateway Caching Kong caches the JWT validation result (user ID + role) for 5 minutes with a configurable TTL. This means a token revocation will take up to 5 minutes to propagate. For immediate revocation needs (e.g., security incident), the auth-service publishes a token invalidation event to RabbitMQ, which the gateway listens for to purge its cache.
Section 3.2

Inter-Service Communication

nullchemy uses a hybrid communication model: synchronous HTTP for reads that require immediate consistency, and asynchronous messaging via RabbitMQ for operations that can tolerate eventual consistency or have high latency.

graph LR
    subgraph Sync["Synchronous (HTTP)"]
        US["user-service"] -->|"GET /verify-user"| AS["auth-service"]
        DS["documents-service"] -->|"GET /users/{id}"| US
        IS["inventory-service"] -->|"GET /documents/{id}"| DS
    end

    subgraph Async["Asynchronous (RabbitMQ)"]
        AS2["auth-service"] -->|"user.registered"| NS["notifications-service"]
        IS2["inventory-service"] -->|"stock.low"| NS
        IS2 -->|"stock.changed"| AN["analytics-service"]
        US2["user-service"] -->|"profile.updated"| AU["audit-service"]
        AS2 -->|"user.login"| AU
        DS2["documents-service"] -->|"document.accessed"| AU
    end
                        
Figure 3: Inter-service communication topology. Solid lines represent synchronous HTTP calls; dashed lines represent asynchronous messages published to RabbitMQ. The audit-service consumes from all services but never initiates communication.
Communication PatternUse CaseJustification
Sync HTTPuser-service → auth-service (verify user exists)Profile creation must fail immediately if the auth identity doesn't exist; async would leave the user in an inconsistent state.
Sync HTTPdocuments-service → user-service (resolve owner)Document metadata responses include owner display name; p99 latency of user lookup is <15ms, within the documents-service SLO.
Async (RabbitMQ)auth-service → notifications-service (welcome email)Email delivery p95 is 300ms–2s (SendGrid); blocking the login endpoint on email delivery would blow the auth-service latency budget.
Async (RabbitMQ)inventory-service → analytics-service (stock changes)Analytics ingestion is designed for eventual consistency; a 1–5 second delay in dashboard updates is acceptable per product requirements.
Async (RabbitMQ)All services → audit-serviceAudit logging must never block or fail the primary operation. If the audit queue is unavailable, services buffer events in memory for up to 60 seconds before dropping (with a logged warning).
Circuit Breakers All synchronous HTTP calls between services are wrapped with a circuit breaker (via the tq-core.messaging module's HTTP client). After 5 consecutive failures in a 30-second window, the circuit opens for 60 seconds. During this period, the calling service returns a degraded response (e.g., document metadata without owner display name) rather than failing entirely.
Section 3.3

Data Flow & Storage

Each service owns its data domain exclusively. No service directly accesses another service's database — all cross-domain data access happens through APIs. This enforces strong encapsulation and allows each service to evolve its schema independently.

graph TD
    subgraph PostgreSQL["PostgreSQL Cluster"]
        subgraph SchemaAuth["auth schema"]
            AuthUsers["users"]
            AuthSessions["sessions"]
        end
        subgraph SchemaUsers["users schema"]
            UserProfiles["profiles"]
            UserPrefs["preferences"]
        end
        subgraph SchemaNotif["notifications schema"]
            NotifTemplates["templates"]
            NotifMessages["messages"]
        end
        subgraph SchemaDocs["documents schema"]
            DocsMeta["documents"]
            DocsVersions["document_versions"]
        end
        subgraph SchemaInv["inventory schema"]
            InvItems["items"]
            InvStock["stock_levels"]
            InvMovements["movements"]
        end
        subgraph SchemaAnalyt["analytics schema"]
            AnalytEvents["events_raw"]
            AnalytMetrics["metrics_hourly"]
        end
        subgraph SchemaAudit["audit schema"]
            AuditLog["audit_log"]
        end
    end

    S3["S3/MinIO (Binary Storage)"]
    Redis["Redis (Cache & Sessions)"]
    Kafka["Kafka (Event Stream)"]

    DocsMeta -->|"S3 key reference"| S3
    AuthSessions -->|"Session cache"| Redis
    AnalytEvents -->|"High-throughput ingest"| Kafka
                        
Figure 4: Data storage topology. Each service owns one schema within the shared PostgreSQL cluster. Binary documents are stored in S3-compatible object storage with metadata in PostgreSQL. Redis serves as a shared cache layer. Kafka is used exclusively by the analytics-service for high-throughput event ingestion.

Consistency Boundaries

  • Strong consistency: Within each service's schema — all reads after a write within the same service reflect the latest state (PostgreSQL's default READ COMMITTED isolation).
  • Eventual consistency: Cross-service data propagation via RabbitMQ — maximum staleness of 5 seconds under normal operating conditions, up to 60 seconds during peak load with message backlog.
  • Cache consistency: Redis entries have explicit TTLs (5 minutes for user profiles, 1 minute for stock levels). Write-through invalidation is used: when a service updates data, it publishes a cache invalidation event that all interested services consume.
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Part IV

Operations

Deployment, technology choices, security, failure modes, and open questions — everything needed to run nullchemy in production.

Section 4.1

Deployment Architecture

nullchemy is deployed on Kubernetes (k8s) with a minimum of three worker nodes across two availability zones. Each microservice runs in its own namespace with dedicated service accounts, resource quotas, and network policies. The deployment is managed via Helm charts stored alongside each service's source code.

graph TD
    subgraph K8s["Kubernetes Cluster"]
        subgraph NS1["namespace: nullchemy-system"]
            Ingress["Ingress (nginx)"]
            Kong["Kong API Gateway"]
        end
        subgraph NS2["namespace: nullchemy-services"]
            AuthPod["auth-service (3 replicas)"]
            UserPod["user-service (2 replicas)"]
            NotifPod["notifications-service (2 replicas)"]
            DocPod["documents-service (2 replicas)"]
            InvPod["inventory-service (3 replicas)"]
            AnalytPod["analytics-service (2 replicas)"]
            AuditPod["audit-service (2 replicas)"]
        end
        subgraph NS3["namespace: nullchemy-data"]
            PG["PostgreSQL (StatefulSet)"]
            RedisST["Redis (StatefulSet)"]
            RabbitST["RabbitMQ (StatefulSet)"]
            KafkaST["Kafka (StatefulSet)"]
        end
    end

    Internet["Internet"] --> Ingress
    Ingress --> Kong
    Kong --> AuthPod
    Kong --> UserPod
    Kong --> NotifPod
    Kong --> DocPod
    Kong --> InvPod
    Kong --> AnalytPod
    Kong --> AuditPod
    AuthPod --> PG
    UserPod --> PG
    NotifPod --> PG
    DocPod --> PG
    InvPod --> PG
    AnalytPod --> PG
    AuditPod --> PG
    AuthPod --> RedisST
    UserPod --> RedisST
    NotifPod --> RabbitST
    InvPod --> RabbitST
    AnalytPod --> KafkaST
    AuditPod --> RabbitST
                        
Figure 5: Kubernetes deployment topology. Services are grouped into three namespaces: system (ingress and gateway), services (application pods), and data (stateful workloads). Network policies restrict cross-namespace traffic to only the documented communication paths.

Resource Allocations

ServiceReplicas (min)CPU Request / LimitMemory Request / LimitHPA Target
auth-service3250m / 1 CPU256Mi / 512MiCPU 70%
user-service2250m / 1 CPU256Mi / 512MiCPU 70%
notifications-service2500m / 2 CPU512Mi / 1GiQueue depth >100
documents-service2250m / 2 CPU512Mi / 1GiCPU 70%
inventory-service3500m / 2 CPU512Mi / 1GiCPU 70%
analytics-service21 CPU / 4 CPU1Gi / 4GiCPU 70%
audit-service2250m / 1 CPU256Mi / 512MiCPU 70%
Auto-Scaling Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA) is configured for every service with CPU utilization as the primary metric. The notifications-service uses a custom metric (RabbitMQ queue depth) as its scaling trigger, since its CPU usage is low but its processing latency is queue-sensitive. Minimum and maximum replicas are set per service based on load-test data; the cluster autoscaler provisions additional nodes when pending pods exceed capacity.
Section 4.2

Technology Stack

CategoryChoiceJustification
API FrameworkFastAPI (Python 3.11+)Async-native, automatic OpenAPI, Pydantic v2 integration — high throughput for I/O-bound services. Benchmarked at 8,000+ RPS per pod for simple read endpoints.
Core Shared Librarytq-core (pip package)Ensures consistency across 7 services; reduces code duplication by an estimated 40%; single source of truth for auth, DB, and schema concerns.
DatabasePostgreSQL 15Strong ACID compliance, JSONB for flexible audit data, full-text search via tsvector, mature async support via asyncpg, table partitioning for time-series data.
Message BrokerRabbitMQ 3.12Reliable delivery with publisher confirms, flexible routing via exchanges, dead-letter queues for failed messages. Kafka considered for analytics ingestion (>50K msg/s) but RabbitMQ suffices for current scale.
Event StreamKafka (for analytics-service)High-throughput event ingestion (100K+ events/sec), log compaction for replay capability, partitioned by event type for parallel consumption.
CacheRedis 7In-memory, sub-millisecond latency, supports rate limiting, session storage, and pub/sub for cache invalidation.
Object StorageAWS S3 / MinIOS3-compatible API; MinIO for local development and CI; AWS S3 for production with lifecycle policies for archival.
API GatewayKong 3.xJWT validation at the edge, rate limiting, request transformation, plugin ecosystem, Prometheus metrics export.
Container OrchestrationKubernetes 1.29Auto-scaling, self-healing, declarative config, pod anti-affinity for HA, namespaces for multi-tenancy isolation.
ObservabilityOpenTelemetry + Jaeger + Prometheus + GrafanaDistributed tracing across all 7 services, metrics for RED (Rate/Error/Duration) dashboards, structured JSON logging to Loki.
CI/CDGitHub Actions + ArgoCDGitOps workflow: CI builds and pushes container images; ArgoCD syncs Kubernetes manifests from the repo to the cluster.
Secrets ManagementKubernetes Secrets + External Secrets OperatorSecrets stored in AWS Secrets Manager, synced to Kubernetes via External Secrets Operator, never committed to Git.
Section 4.3

Cross-Cutting Concerns

This section is a stub. Once the following information becomes available, it will cover:

  • Distributed tracing strategy: Full OpenTelemetry instrumentation across all 7 services — trace context propagation through Kong, HTTP headers, and RabbitMQ message headers. Jaeger as the trace backend with sampling rate of 10% in production, 100% in staging.
  • Centralized configuration management: Kubernetes ConfigMaps for non-sensitive settings, with a migration plan to a dedicated configuration service (or HashiCorp Consul) for runtime reloading without pod restarts.
  • Global rate limiting and throttling: Tiered rate limits — per-IP at the Kong gateway (100 req/min), per-user at the service level (1,000 req/min), and per-endpoint for sensitive operations like password reset (5 req/hour).
  • Audit trail requirements: All mutating operations (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) across all services must produce an audit event with user ID, timestamp, resource identifier, and old/new values. Retention period: 7 years for compliance, with automated archival to cold storage after 90 days.
  • Data retention and archival policies: Per-service data retention rules — audit logs (7 years), notification delivery logs (2 years), analytics raw events (1 year), document versions (all versions retained until parent document deletion + 30 days).
Section 4.4

Security Considerations

🔐

Authentication

JWT-based with HS256 (symmetric) for inter-service communication and RS256 (asymmetric) planned for external clients. Refresh tokens are stored server-side and can be revoked. MFA via TOTP is enforced for admin accounts.

🛡️

Authorization

Role-based access control (RBAC) with four tiers: superadmin, admin, user, readonly. Each endpoint declares required roles via a dependency. The API gateway enforces coarse-grained access; services enforce fine-grained ownership checks.

🔒

TLS Everywhere

All external traffic is TLS-terminated at the ingress (cert-manager with Let's Encrypt). Internal service-to-service traffic is encrypted via Kubernetes network policies with mTLS (Istio sidecar, planned for Phase 2).

🔑

Secrets Management

No secrets in environment variables, code, or ConfigMaps. All secrets (DB passwords, API keys, JWT signing keys) are stored in AWS Secrets Manager and injected via the External Secrets Operator at pod startup.

🌐

Network Policies

Kubernetes NetworkPolicies restrict pod-to-pod communication to only the documented paths. The audit-service, for example, can only receive from RabbitMQ — it cannot initiate any outbound connections.

📋

Audit Compliance

Every mutating operation is logged with user ID, IP address, timestamp, and before/after values. Audit logs are immutable (append-only table, no UPDATE/DELETE permissions for application users).

Critical Security Requirement The JWT signing secret (SECRET_KEY) must be rotated every 90 days. Rotation is performed by generating a new key, adding it to the tq-core configuration as a secondary validation key, waiting for all tokens signed with the old key to expire (8 days, based on refresh token lifetime), and then removing the old key. This process is documented in the runbook.
Section 4.5

Failure Modes & Resilience

The following table catalogs the top failure scenarios, their estimated probability, impact severity, and the mitigation strategy in place. Probabilities are based on industry data for similar Kubernetes-deployed microservice platforms operating at comparable scale.

Failure ScenarioProbabilityImpactMitigation
auth-service outage — all auth-service pods become unavailable Low
HA deployment (3 replicas, anti-affinity)
High
No new logins; existing tokens continue working for 5 min (gateway cache)
API gateway caches JWT validation for 5 minutes. During outage window, existing sessions continue uninterrupted. New logins queue at the gateway and are served when auth-service recovers. HPA scales to 5 replicas under load.
PostgreSQL cluster failure — primary database becomes unavailable Low
Managed PostgreSQL with automated failover
Critical
All services lose read/write capability
Automated failover to a read replica (promoted to primary) within 60 seconds. Services use connection pooling with pool_pre_ping=True to detect stale connections. Write operations queue in RabbitMQ (buffer up to 5 min of inventory movements). Read-heavy services (analytics) continue serving from read replicas.
RabbitMQ broker outage — message broker unavailable Medium
StatefulSet with persistent volumes
Medium
Async operations delayed; sync operations unaffected
Services buffer outgoing messages in memory for up to 60 seconds. After buffer exhaustion, messages are dropped with a logged warning. Audit events are the highest priority — if the audit queue is unreachable, services continue operating but emit metric alerts. Notifications may be delayed by up to 5 minutes.
Memory leak in a service — gradual OOM across replicas Medium
Python's garbage collector mitigates most leaks
Medium
Degraded performance, cascading pod restarts
Kubernetes liveness probes detect OOM conditions and restart pods. HPA scales up replicas to absorb traffic during restarts. Memory limits are set at 2× the steady-state usage to provide headroom. Prometheus alerts trigger when memory usage exceeds 80% of limit for >5 minutes.
DDoS attack on the API gateway — volumetric traffic spike Medium
Public-facing APIs are always targets
High
Gateway overload leads to request queuing and timeouts
Kong rate limiting at the edge (100 req/min per IP, configurable). Cloud-level DDoS protection (AWS Shield / Cloudflare). Ingress configured with max_connections limits. WAF rules block known attack patterns. Excess traffic is shed with HTTP 429 responses rather than queuing indefinitely.
Graceful Degradation When a dependent service is unavailable, callers are designed to degrade gracefully rather than fail. For example, the documents-service returns document metadata without the owner's display name if the user-service is unreachable (the field is populated as null with a degraded: true flag in the response). This ensures partial functionality while the dependency recovers.
Section 4.6

Open Questions

This section is a stub. Once the following information becomes available, it will cover:

  • Database instance strategy: Whether to migrate from a shared PostgreSQL cluster (with per-service schemas) to independent RDS instances per service. The trigger for this migration is either (a) exceeding 50K sustained RPS, (b) a service requiring a different database engine (e.g., DynamoDB for analytics), or (c) operational isolation requirements from a specific compliance framework.
  • Service mesh adoption: Evaluation of Istio or Linkerd for mTLS, traffic splitting, and fine-grained observability. The current NetworkPolicy-based approach is sufficient for the initial deployment but may not scale to 20+ services.
  • Event sourcing for inventory: Whether to adopt a full event-sourcing pattern (Kafka-backed) for the inventory domain, which would enable temporal queries ("what was the stock level at time T?") and simplify the analytics integration. Trade-off: increased operational complexity vs. richer query capabilities.
  • Multi-region deployment: Requirements for active-active or active-passive multi-region deployment. This impacts database replication strategy (PostgreSQL logical replication vs. Aurora Global Database), DNS routing (Route 53 latency-based vs. GeoDNS), and data residency compliance.
  • API versioning policy: Formalizing the API versioning strategy — currently /api/v1/ is used, but the deprecation window, backward compatibility guarantees, and version sunset process need to be defined with product stakeholders.
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End of System Design Document · nullchemy v2.0 · June 2026